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5  Justice and Children’s Well-Being and 
Well-Becoming1
5.1  Introduction
Most theorists of justice would agree that they have to specify two things: the currency of 
justice – which goods should be shared – and the rule of justice – how those goods should 
be shared. I like to add three more things that every theory of justice should say something 
about: the social context in which those goods should be shared, the basic features of 
the agents of justice, and the ultimate goal of justice. If one wants to design a theory of 
justice for children, all of those five questions should be answered and I suppose they 
will be answered in at least slightly but decisively different ways than they are answered 
in relation to justice for fully grown and healthy adults. I will not explore the possibility of 
trade-offs between justice for children and justice for adults and how such conflicts can 
be resolved. My main claim in this chapter is concerned with the role that the concepts of 
well-being and well-becoming can play in answering those questions and in the design of 
a theory of justice for children. As I want to show, well-being and well-becoming can serve 
as the ultimate goals of justice, as they allow us to better understand the specific needs of 
children as agents of justice and their embeddedness in certain social contexts, and they 
can guide the selection of the currency of justice and the rule of their distribution. The 
answers I want to sketch in this chapter are developed from the perspective of a certain 
theoretical framework which I want to call the recognition approach (Schweiger 2012; 
Schweiger 2013). This approach is nowadays most often connected to the seminal works of 
Axel Honneth and its central assumption is that the proper experience of recognition and 
the protection from misrecognition – I prefer the notion of disrespect – is the fundamental 
claim of justice of all human beings (Honneth 1996; Honneth 2012). I view recognition and 
well-being and well-becoming as being intertwined in many ways and argue that a focus 
on the latter is well suited to guide the design and implementation of justice for children. 
The goals to protect the well-being and well-becoming of children and to protect their 
ability to experience recognition converge.
5.2  The Goals of Justice: Well-Being and Well-Becoming
The ultimate goals of justice for children are their well-being and well-becoming (Graf 
and Schweiger 2015). Or to put it differently: a social context should be just, because 
1 This research was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), Project: P 26480-G15.
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this protects the well-being and well-becoming of children. This claim does not imply 
that under the conditions of justice the well-being and well-becoming of children 
cannot be hurt and violated in other ways, for example by sickness, accidents or 
natural disasters. It also does not mean that justice prescribes all interpersonal 
interactions between children and adults and among children. A social context 
can be just, but the people within in it can still act immorally and hurt each other 
intentionally or by accident. Justice does not regulate all actions happening within a 
social context but is concerned with its institutional framework and that framework 
should be designed in a way in which it is best suited to protect the well-being and 
well-becoming of children.
Such an orientation on well-being and well-becoming has not been spelled out in 
detail within the recognition approach, so I want to make at least a few remarks on 
why I think this is a route worth following. In a nutshell, a society is just insofar as 
it protects the ability of its members to experience those forms of proper recognition 
that are needed for their identity building and the realization of their autonomy. So, 
the recognition approach has a strong focus on autonomy and personal freedom – 
which it shares with many other theories of justice like the capability approach – 
and is concerned with their intersubjective and social conditions. This implies well-
being and well-becoming in at least two important ways: First, autonomy is part of 
any conceptualization and realization of well-being and well-becoming. Second, they 
are concerned with these intersubjective conditions which the recognition approach 
views as important. Justice is not only concerned with autonomy but with its social 
embedding and its individual realization in a social context and in interaction with 
others. Well-being, well-becoming and autonomy – in the understanding of the 
recognition approach as personal self-realization and the realization of those life 
plans that one values – are all intertwined ecological concepts in the sense that they 
refer to the wider social embeddedness of human beings and their dependency on 
other humans and institutions. In a narrow sense, recognition is a part of well-being 
and well-becoming, but in a wider sense the three forms and modes of recognition that 
Honneth distinguishes – care, respect, social esteem – can be interpreted to describe 
what humans need for their well-being and well-becoming. So far the recognition 
approach has mainly focussed on adults and dealt with childhood primarily as an 
important preparatory stage, in which the experience of recognition is necessary for an 
individual to develop positive self-relations and to become an autonomous member of 
society. But justice for children goes beyond that scope and has to ask what children 
are entitled to as children as well. This is far more and entirely different than being 
able to realize themselves because self-realization and autonomy – as the recognition 
approach rightfully claims – only develop during childhood. The developmental 
perspective that conceptualizes justice for children from the envisaged product of an 
autonomous adult has to be integrated into a wider understanding of the actual well-
being of children that they are entitled to. So the focus I choose here follows from 
the ‘nature’ of childhood and is an expansion of the current focus on the forms and 
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modes of recognition that are demanded by justice for adults to also look at those 
dimensions which are important for children.
I understand the well-being and well-becoming of children as multidimensional, 
comprising of subjective and objective dimensions (Axford 2012). They are therefore 
not only concerned with the subjective satisfaction or happiness, although these 
are certainly of importance. Furthermore well-being and well-becoming and their 
different dimensions are context-sensitive and context-transcending alike, meaning 
that they have to be determined always within a certain context, but they also have a 
universal core that reflects central features shared among all children. For example, 
shelter and clothing are important for all children because they are all sensitive 
and vulnerable beings, but social and environmental factors also heavily influence 
which shelter and clothing is needed and how it influences their well-being and well-
becoming. Before I go into more detail on which dimensions of well-being and well-
becoming should be distinguished and how they specify the currency of justice, I 
want to examine three points: the relation between well-being and well-becoming, 
their relation to autonomy and freedom, and their relation to the position of children 
as particularly vulnerable beings.
Well-being refers to the current state of a person while well-becoming refers to the 
development from one state to another over time. Well-becoming can happen from a 
state of ill-being to one of well-being, or from a state of well-being to another one of 
well-being. I think it is important to stress that justice should be concerned with both 
and that neither sees children only as adults-to-be nor neglects that most children 
will become adults. Also, well-becoming does not only relate to the development 
from a child into an adult although it is reasonable to view this transition as being 
of particular importance. Humans are developing throughout their entire life and 
well-being and well-becoming are interrelated in every phase of it. The influence of 
behavioural patterns and environmental factors on later health, or the influence of the 
participation in the labour market on the socio-economic position after retirement, 
are both examples of this entanglement (Mortimer and Shanahan 2003). Furthermore, 
the relation between well-being and well-becoming is not straightforward in the way 
that well-being necessarily enables well-becoming, and both can come into conflict 
with each other. For example, obligatory education can lower the subjective well-
being of a child although it is necessary for its well-being and enhances the chance 
of well-being as an adult. In this case, most would suggest that the reduction in well-
being is justified by the favourable results in adulthood. But think of the case in which 
a child grows up in severe poverty and through this develops certain resilience skills 
that ultimately let her become a successful and rich entrepreneur. The hardship of 
poverty is not justified because of this favourable result, and this certainly should 
not justify the adoption of a policy in which all children have to grow up poor so 
that they can become resilient and hardened. First, in most cases poverty does not 
have such favourable results but rather negative ones (Eamon 2001). Second, it seems 
reasonable to apply a certain threshold of well-being that must be reached, and that 
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falling under that threshold cannot be justified by any kinds of latter gains. Third, the 
preferences of the child have to be taken into account and it seems unlikely, though 
not impossible that it would choose to grow up in poverty just for the small chance 
of becoming rich someday (especially if the chance of being rich in later life is much 
higher if one is already born rich, so it would be reasonable to choose to be born rich 
rather than poor). But the line between a justified lowering of well-being in order to 
influence well-becoming and an unjustified one is not always easy to draw. And the 
causality between certain actions and external factors and the later well-being or ill-
being is also often murky. Despite these difficulties, the evidence is overwhelming 
that childhood is a particular phase of development that has significant influence on 
the whole life course. The research is substantial and growing on the short and long-
term effects of different living conditions, environmental factors and behavioural 
patterns and how these effects are transmitted. For that reason, justice cannot be only 
concerned with how children actually live but has to ask how this shapes the future 
prospects of those children. A society that aims to be just will strive for conditions 
that take into account the whole life course, so that justice for children connects with 
justice for adults.
Most theories of justice – as well as those of morality – place a high value on 
autonomy and personal freedom. A just society should also be a free one, in the 
sense that it allows and protects the autonomy of its member to the greatest possible 
degree and leaves ample room for them to pursue and realize their own goals and life 
plans. To design justice for children with an orientation towards their well-being and 
well-becoming appears to come into conflict with the goal of autonomy in two ways: 
first, children are allowed less autonomy compared to adults in the sense that their 
cognitive skills and capacities are insufficient and still developing and that they are to 
a greater degree dependent on adults in order to make good choices. As such, justice 
for children will demand to limit the autonomy and personal freedom of children 
and be paternalistic in many ways. Second, well-being and well-becoming can be 
severely hurt by autonomous choices that a just society should still allow or even 
protect to make, for example, unhealthy life style choices like dangerous activities 
and sports. There are cases in which actions that endanger one’s own well-being and 
well-becoming are even morally good, for example to help others. As I will argue, 
autonomy is also important in the design of justice for children with an orientation 
towards their well-being and well-becoming although it is reasonably limited. As I 
have said, autonomy, the ability to make own choices and to realize one’s self, is itself 
an important dimension of the well-being and well-becoming of nearly all humans, 
and also for children. So to say that the goal of justice is the protection of the well-
being and well-becoming of children does not rule out that autonomy has a place in it 
and that it is demanded by justice to give autonomy space to unfold. Furthermore, it 
is true that autonomy is a developing ability and that especially very young children 
are dependent on the guidance and care of adults, but it is also true that children 
have their own wishes and preferences and that they value their autonomy even at 
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Salzburg
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 13.01.17 10:44
88   Justice and Children’s Well-Being and Well-Becoming
young ages. So it is also important for justice to give children the opportunity to make 
their own choices, even if this is limited by adults to protect their safety, their current 
and future well-being. But this autonomy is limited insofar as there are good reasons 
to interfere because it can be rightfully assumed that they do not have the ability to 
assess the effects of their choices. Again, it is not possible to draw the line here all 
too easily, and rules based on age limits are only a decent and workable though still 
imperfect approximation. Also, the orientation on well-becoming includes that one 
highly valuable goal of justice for children is that they grow up in an environment 
that allows and supports them to become autonomous beings when they are adults.
The third issue I want to discuss is the relation of well-being and well-becoming 
and the vulnerability of children. All humans are vulnerable and in danger of being 
hurt, but children are so to a greater extent and in need of the protection of others. 
This is clear for very young children, and the vulnerability wanes over time although 
it never disappears. This greater vulnerability is also reflected by an orientation 
towards well-being and well-becoming. It places the physiological, psychological 
and social needs of children at the centre of attention and develops from here what 
children are entitled to and what society owes to them in order to grow-up healthily 
and protected from needless harm and suffering. Therefore, to protect the well-being 
and well-becoming of children implies first and foremost to protect them from being 
harmed and to design the institutions in ways that are sensitive to the different phases 
of childhood. But the vulnerability of children not only refers to their current state but 
also to their future and well-becoming. As already mentioned, there is overwhelming 
evidence that different forms of harm and hardship during childhood have long-lasting 
and severe consequences. This also means that children are not only vulnerable as 
children but that their future well-being is also vulnerable to violation. Again, this 
implies that protecting children is important, in order to protect adults.
In conclusion, well-being and well-becoming can serve as comprehensive goals 
for the design of justice, taking into account central features of childhood and the 
particular status of children. It is therefore rooted in the peculiar ‘nature’ of children 
as agents of justice.
5.3  Choosing Dimensions of Well-Being and Well-Becoming and 
the Currency of Justice
I will now turn my attention to choosing the currency of justice for children, 
which I will develop from my understanding of well-being and well-becoming as 
multidimensional. A currency of justice should satisfy at least two criteria: it should 
capture the important differences between persons, and it should be distributional. 
This implies that differences that are important to the well-being and well-becoming 
of individuals but cannot be influenced by the societal framework and set of 
institutions are not adequate subjects of justice and should not be used to determine 
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its currency. I do not wish to explore here the deep and sophisticated debate on the 
currency of justice, but rather sketch out why capabilities and functionings appear 
to be the right choice if one is concerned with justice for children (Anderson 2010). 
Capabilities and functionings have the advantage of being sensitive to differences in 
the usage of goods and resources and they are sensitive to discrimination and other 
injustices that affect the conversion of resources into capabilities and functionings. 
A theory of justice for children should be concerned with what they are actually able 
to do and be. Capabilities and functionings are ends, whereas resources or goods 
are means and, therefore, a focus on capabilities and functionings is able to directly 
compare differences in what ultimately matters: the well-being and well-becoming of 
children. For children, resources are also very often only of indirect importance and 
mediated through their care-givers and other institutions. Income, wealth and voting 
rights for example are of no direct use for small children but do heavily affect their 
well-being and well-becoming. A capability approach seems more suited to capture 
these dependencies. But what capabilities and functionings are qualified to serve 
for comparisons in well-being and well-becoming and should be specified as the 
currency of justice? Before I explore this question, I want to begin by asking whether 
the currency of justice for children should be capabilities or functionings or both.
Most capability theorists prefer capabilities over functionings because of the 
high value of autonomy and choice. Within the broader setting of political liberalism, 
such authors like Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum argue that people should have 
central capabilities but it should be left to their own choice whether or not they want 
to realize them as functionings (Nussbaum 2011). An example that is often used is 
that of the capability to be well nourished, which certainly is a central one, but that 
people should still have the option to fast and if one chooses to do so and therefore 
does not realize the functioning of being well nourished this does not poses a problem 
of justice. This argument has plenty of force but it also has its limitations that are 
well acknowledged by capability theorists: first, the problem of adaptive preferences 
which can not only lead people to adapt to unjust circumstances and the deprivation 
of even central capabilities, but also effects whether people want to realize certain 
capabilities as functionings (Khader 2009). Think of a society in which women have 
the right to vote and all necessary access to do so safely but most decline because of 
their ideological conviction that women are not capable of political decision-making. 
Most would agree that justice should also be concerned with such an issue and one 
should not be satisfied with simply providing the capability to vote but to make the 
participation of women actually happen. It is also the functioning that counts. In the 
case of children, a focus on functionings is further supported by the abovementioned 
limited capacity to act autonomously and rationally. Children do not just need the 
capability to have education, but should realize it and acquire the functioning of 
being educated because this is relevant for their current and their future well-being. 
The same goes for other important capabilities such as being healthy, being socially 
included or having shelter, nourishment and clothing. Another practical reason why 
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functionings are of importance is that they are measurable – at least a lot more easily 
than capabilities – and comparable (Alkire 2008).
There is also a fluent passage between capabilities and functionings and they 
both have a certain plasticity. There are many stages between having the capability to 
be well nourished to the realization of the functioning to be well nourished, and both 
can be satisfied in various ways. Having this capability can mean having immediate 
access to food that is in the refrigerator, it can mean having access to a supermarket 
and having the funds to buy food there; to be well nourished can mean to have just 
eaten one’s favourite sandwich, or it can refer to a person who is actually hungry 
because she has not eaten for a few hours but is healthy and in general has enough 
to eat, and good meals. On closer inspection, the boundary between capabilities and 
functionings becomes less clear. These arguments support my view that they are 
both of importance for well-being and well-becoming and that a theory of justice for 
children does not need to make a general decision on which one is more important. 
Rather, if a set or list of capabilities and functionings is chosen it has to be made 
explicit whether and for whom the benchmark is a capability or a functioning. For 
example, for an eight-year-old child’s education should be interpreted in terms of a 
clearly defined functioning – the eight-year-old should actually go to school – while 
for a sixteen-year-old it could be interpreted in terms of a capability – a sixteen-year-
old should have the opportunity to go to school but is also free to choose a training on 
the job to become a plumber.
But how to choose the dimensions of well-being and well-becoming that should 
be used as the currency of justice? I support a pragmatic and empirically informed 
approach as it was used by Mario Biggeri and his colleagues, who distinguish 
eighteen dimensions of children’s well-being following expert opinions, in relation to 
existing lists and conventions, and a participatory process with children (Biggeri and 
Mehrotra 2011). Still, no method to select capabilities and functionings will be perfect 
and no list will be exhaustive. Justice should inform and guide the societal framework 
and the design of its institutions and for that it is neither necessary to draft a full 
list out of theory, nor can empirical evidence be enough, but has to be interpreted 
before the normative goals of justice. If we want to design justice in the context of the 
education system, a more refined and tailored list of capabilities and functionings is 
needed than if justice is discussed on the level of a whole society. In particular I want 
to highlight four points that seem crucial:
1. First, the selection of capabilities and functionings has to be context-sensitive in 
the sense that it reflects the context in which the child grows up and lives. The 
functioning to be socially included is important for all children, but there are 
crucial differences for example between developed welfare states and developing 
countries, and justice should reflect those differences in that it neither demands 
too little nor too much. This demands also an ‘ecological perspective’ on 
children’s well-being and well-becoming and how they are influenced by the 
different environments – as important conversion factors – in which children are 
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embedded. Choosing capabilities and functionings without taking into account 
the social embedding of children could also lead to an overly individualistic 
approach.
2. Second, the capabilities and functionings have to be developmental-sensitive, 
which means that they have to account for the particular phase of childhood 
and the different developmental stages of children. As previously mentioned, 
autonomy becomes more important as children grow older, implying a shift from 
a focus on functionings to a focus on capabilities, for example when it comes to 
choices of education or their social inclusion. It is also needed to define successive 
development goals that should be reached over time and that can be monitored. 
For the developmental perspective, the concept of evolving capabilities and 
functionings appears well-suited (Ballet, Biggeri, and Comim 2011). They should 
allow us to capture the well-being and the influence on the future well-becoming 
in the sense of providing children with those capabilities and functionings that 
lead to having certain important capabilities and functionings in later life.
3. Third, children should be included when it comes to choosing the capabilities 
and functionings of being heard and being able to participate are of certain 
importance. While the first one is a methodological issue, the second one refers 
to the place of participation and autonomy in a list of central capabilities and 
functionings of children. For adults it is not questionable that these are of utmost 
importance and that a just society strives for them, but this is also true for 
children. They are entitled to the possibility to make choices for themselves to a 
certain extent and to act as citizens with rights and duties.
4. Fourth, the subjective dimension of well-being has to be reflected at least partly 
by the selection of capabilities and functionings. This is a tricky and controversial 
claim because subjective well-being is something that can be influenced by so 
many factors that can and should not be controlled by the institutional setting of 
a society. A child can be unhappy because she does not get the birthday present 
that she wished for, or feels rejected because she got a bad grade on a test or 
because she had an accident that means staying in hospital for a few days. All 
these influences pose no violation of justice but can significantly reduce subjective 
well-being. Why then not leave justice to be concerned only with capabilities and 
functionings that can be measured objectively as Elizabeth Anderson argues, for 
example (Anderson 2010)? I see three reasons here: on the one hand, subjective 
well-being is not completely random; its relation to objective dimensions of 
well-being are well known and studied (Aldgate et al. 2006). As such, subjective 
well-being can and is heavily influenced by capabilities and functionings that 
fall within the realm of justice, and it appears to be a valuable information to 
know how a certain implementation of justice, a policy or a distributional pattern 
influences the subjective well-being of children and how they feel about it. On 
the other hand, objective well-being and well-becoming is also influenced by the 
subjective well-being. Children need love, care and personal attention as well 
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as needing positive self-relations and feelings and experiences of happiness in 
order to develop those objectively measurable capabilities and functionings. But, 
finally, subjective well-being is not only valuable as a means to support justice 
but in itself, for the individual as well as for society as a whole. A society in 
which every child has secured access to all capabilities and functionings that are 
necessary for their objective well-being and well-becoming but in which despite 
that most or a significant portion of children have a constantly low subjective 
well-being and feel sad, rejected, lonely or unloved and cared for, cannot be 
deemed just,’ but rather fails those children.
In conclusion, the currency of justice should be those capabilities and functionings 
that comprise the well-being and well-becoming of children. Such a list does not 
have to be final but should be drafted based on the best empirical evidence available, 
bearing in mind that children’s lives and futures are shaped by the environments in 
which they live and grow up and the different institutions and agents they interact 
with, with children being heard and involved, giving them space to make their own 
choices and with the goal in mind to support and protect their current well-being and 
to develop into autonomous adults and members of society, who also enjoy a state of 
well-being.
5.4  Pluralism and the Rule of Justice
David Miller has argued that rather than specifying one rule or principle of justice, a 
tripartite approach is more reasonable (Miller 1999). He distinguishes the principles 
of need – which can be interpreted as sufficiency –, of desert, and of equality and 
grounds them in the different types of social relations in which people participate. 
The principle of need should be applied in such relations as the family and solidaristic 
communities, the principle of desert is the right one to follow in such instrumental 
associations as in the market, and the principle of equality is important for the 
realm of citizenship. These three share certain similarities, although developed from 
a different perspective, with the tripartite of the three modes of recognition – care, 
esteem and respect – that can also serve as the basis for a pluralistic approach to the 
rule of justice. In contrast to such a pluralistic approach, most capability theorists 
follow a sufficietarian route and are concerned only with the minimum floor of justice 
(Robeyns 2005). Furthermore, it is not clear if and how Miller’s considerations are 
applicable to children. In this section I want to argue that such pluralism is indeed a 
reasonable approach, but that this pluralism is not primarily rooted in the different 
social relations in which children participate but foremost in the different kinds of 
capabilities and functionings they are entitled to.
I will pick out just three types of capabilities and functionings that are relevant to 
justice: to be healthy, to be able to realize one’s own choices, and to not be exploited. 
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All three subdomains and thresholds have to be specified in order to be applicable 
to guide the design of an institutional framework, but for my purpose I will discuss 
them only on a very abstract level. First, all children are entitled to certain capabilities 
and functionings without differences and the functioning – not only the capability 
– of not being exploited is one of these. Here the rule of equality should be followed 
and it cannot be superseded by the specific context in which a child participates. 
Every child should realize this functioning whether in the context of her family and 
friendships, in those of her school or in any other one. Second, also the capability 
or functioning of being healthy is not context-sensitive in the sense that the social 
context can determine how it should be distributed among children. But other 
differences are of importance, for example maturity and age, influences that cannot 
be societally controlled or where this control comes into serious conflict with other 
claims of justice, and the limitation of resources and knowledge. This means that 
older children should be allowed to risk their health if they wish to do so (risky sports, 
unhealthy eating patterns etc.) and the functioning of being healthy converts into the 
capability to be healthy, it also implies that such differences in health that result from 
accidents or genetic variation are not unjust and that claims of justice are restricted 
by the health status that is actually possible to achieve by a reasonable allocation of 
resources (it is not reasonable to invest all resources into research on one very rare 
and painful disease if that leaves no resources to cure less severe diseases). So, in 
general terms the functioning of being healthy should be the target which justice 
should aim for and which should guide the design of the institutional framework; 
every child is equally entitled to health. But on closer inspection it becomes clear 
that the rule of equality also implies a rule of sufficiency: every child is entitled to 
sufficient resources and conversion factors to be healthy (e.g. health care, health 
literacy, healthy food and space for exercise and play). Third, the capability or 
functioning to realize one’s own choices cannot be granted to all children equally 
because it is very likely that different choices and their realization are in conflict with 
each other. Furthermore, some choices are very likely never to be realized because the 
child has not the sufficient resources, capacities or due to other limitations. So why 
view this capability as an important one to begin with? On the one hand, there is no 
doubt that the capability to realize one’s own goal is of importance for the well-being 
of children, because a life of continuous failure and rejection is not a good one and 
also negatively influences other important capabilities and functionings. On the other 
hand, within the notion of capabilities and functionings themselves, the importance 
of realizing one’s own goal is inherent: a capability is exactly the ability to realize a 
functioning if one wishes to do so and this personal freedom is highly valued. In this 
regard, the capability to realize one’s own goal is embedded and an important part of 
such other capabilities and functionings as autonomy, mental health, participation 
and inclusion, or – more specifically – leisure activities and friendships. A society 
in which children’s capabilities and functionings were adequately protected but in 
which they are unable to realize those goals and choices they value, would be unjust 
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because it would not be a free society. Take for example grades in school that a child 
wants to achieve. It would seem unjust to grade all children equally if they display a 
difference in effort and achievements, and also the idea of sufficiency seems odd in 
that case, considering that there is no certain threshold of grades that all children 
are entitled to. If a child wants to get a certain grade she has to achieve it, in the 
interpretation that she deserves that grade. Such an idea of desert on the level of 
grading is embedded in the idea that all children should reach a sufficient level of 
education – again not only the capability – and that this sufficiency also serves the 
idea of a comprehensive equality of opportunity in later life. The importance of the 
idea of desert lies also in that the development of positive self-relations such as self-
esteem, self-confidence, and self-respect is to some part dependent on the experience 
of social esteem for the realization of one’s own choices and for being responsible for 
them (Honneth 1996). This differentiating character of desert is an important part of 
autonomy in general and also capabilities and functionings. In regard to children, this 
rule of justice may appear of less importance than for adults, where desert plays an 
important role in the justification of the distribution of income, wealth and positions. 
But also during childhood and for the well-being of children, some capabilities and 
functionings imply that they have to be deserved and that the institutional framework 
should be designed in that way that they are distributed accordingly. However, as 
previously mentioned, this is not bound to a specific social context and desert may be 
the right rule to be applied in private and public life alike.
In conclusion, justice for children that wants to be comprehensive will incorporate 
a pluralism of rules of distribution that are applied to the certain capabilities and 
functionings that are important for the well-being and well-becoming of children. 
I have argued that the tripartite differentiation of David Miller can provide a good 
starting point, and one that concurs with the main assumption of the recognition 
approach that children have a claim for the experience of all three forms of recognition 
– care, esteem and respect. Such rules also reflect the developmental dimension of 
justice that is expressed in its orientation on the well-being and well-becoming of 
children. The rules themselves – sufficiency, equality and desert – are of importance 
for children and express their moral and political status.
5.5  Conclusions
Well-being and well-becoming of children are highly complex and multi-dimensional 
concepts, which pose difficulties on the theoretical and practical level of their 
implementation in policies and the design of the institutional framework of a society. 
Still, they possess significant normative force, not only but especially in the context of 
childhood. Children are neither the fully rational and autonomous beings that regular 
theories of justice have in mind nor are they only adults-to-be and fully irrational and 
helpless without their own preferences and ideas of a good life. In this paper I have 
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only been able to present a brief and in many aspects insufficient and incomplete 
sketch of how well-being and well-becoming can guide the conceptualization of 
justice for children. Such a theory will also be non-ideal in the sense that it has to 
be context-sensitive and to incorporate the best available empirical and theoretical 
knowledge about how children’s well-being and well-becoming is influenced by 
themselves and the various environments in which they grow up and live in. This 
knowledge – which I had no opportunity to discuss here – is also not fully coherent 
and conclusive and has to be interpreted before the normative idea of a just society 
and its goals.
References
Aldgate, Jane, David Jones, Wendy Rose, and Carole Jeffery, eds. 2006. The Developing World of the 
Child. 1st ed. London / Philadelphia, PE: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
Alkire, Sabina. 2008. “Choosing Domains: The Capability Approach and Multidimensional Poverty.” 
In The Many Dimensions of Poverty, edited by Nanak Kakwani and Jacques Silber, 1st ed., 
89–119. Basingstoke / New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2010. “Justifying the Capability Approach to Justice.” In Measuring Justice: 
Primary Goods and Capabilities, edited by Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns, 1st ed., 
81–100. Cambridge / New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Axford, Nick. 2012. Exploring Concepts of Child Well-Being: Implications for Children’s Services. 
Bristol: Policy.
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